Academic papers

An outline for funding adaptation and disasters management schemes - by Dr. Jan Kunnas, Sustainable Bioenergy group, Department of Biological and Environmental Science, University of Jyvaskyla, Finland. "This paper develops further a proposal to split continued climate negotiations into two separate blocks. The first block deals with historical emissions of greenhouse gases, including a mutual debt cancellation. The second block deals with future emissions and how to finance adaption to climate change. Following the polluter pays-principle, the funds should be collected in proportion to the responsibility for proceeding climate change and redistributed in proportion to the needs for adaption and management of climate-related risks. The system of fund collection after the cut-off point could be taken from Oliver Tickell's Kyoto2-proposal, which proposes a system for levying climate funds via fossil-fuel production permits. Finally, some incentives to join the proposed scheme are suggested." Published in the Climate 2011 virtual conference, 7 November 2011.
Jim Hansen's home page, with links to his many articles, both academic and popular. Jim Hansen has been a major source of inspiration for Kyoto2, and we have adopted his target to bring about a reduction of greenhouse gases from their present level to 350ppm CO2 eq by 2050.
CO2 emissions increasing faster than expected - CSIRO press release - the average growth rate of carbon dioxide emissions increased from 1.1 per cent a year in the 1990s to a three per cent increase per year in the 2000s, according to a CSIRO paper published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. Lead author Dr Mike Raupach said that nearly eight billion tonnes of carbon were emitted globally into the atmosphere as carbon dioxide in 2005, compared with just six billion tonnes in 1995. "A major driver of the accelerating growth rate in emissions is that, globally, we're burning more carbon per dollar of wealth created. In the last few years, the global usage of fossil fuels has actually become less efficient. This adds to pressures from increasing population and wealth." Full article (pdf): Global and regional drivers of accelerating CO2 emissions.
Auctions for CO2 Allowances - A Straw Man a report by Karsten Neuhoff (University of Cambridge) of a 1-day workshop held by the Electricity Policy Research Group (EPRG) to address the economic and technical issues relating to auctions for CO2 allowances in the European Emissions Trading Scheme, 11 April 2007.
Border Tax Adjustments: A Feasible way to Support Stringent Emission Trading by R. Ismer and K. Neuhoff, published by University of Cambridge Department of Applied Economics. "ABSRACT: CO2 emission allowances help to internalise effects of fossil fuel consumption on global climate and sea levels. However, consumption, production and investment decisions do not reach the optimal allocation when the scheme is only implemented in some countries. Production with inefficient facilities in nonparticipating countries may even increase. Border tax adjustment for costs incurred from procuring CO2 emission allowances reduces the leakage. We show that border tax adjustment (BTA) can be both feasible and compatible with WTO constraints. Practicable implementability requires a focus on CO2 emissions from certain processed materials and a separate treatment of electric energy input."
James Lovelock - the website of this distinguished scientist who has done so much to advance global awareness of climate change.
Carbon trading - a critical conversation is a powerful critique of the world's existing carbon management regime under the Kyoto Protocol. Published by the Dag Hammarskjöld Centre, September 2006, edited by Larry Lohmann of The Corner House.
Regulation by prices, quantities or both: a review of instrument choice - by Cameron Hepburn, published in the Oxford Review of Economic Policy Vol. 22 No. 2, (summer 2006). The discussion is applied to climate policy and is relevant to the Kyoto2 proposals especially in its discussion of hybrid instruments, which we intend to incorporate: specifically, the notion of auction taking place within a trading range bounded by a floor (a low price below which the auction is stopped) and a ceiling (a high price which, once achieved, allows the sale of greater than allocated volumes at that price). This has the advantage of limiting economic impacts at the top end, and guaranteeing minimum returns on investments at the bottom end.
Auctioning of EU ETS phase II allowances: how and why? by Cameron Hepburn et al. Published in Climate Policy 6 (2006) pp.137-160. Clearly sets out the overwhelming economic, legal and moral case for auctioning Allowances within the EU-ETS.
Oxford Review of Economic Policy - Climate Change Policy - Vol. 19 No. 3 of autumn 2003 is a special issue devoted to climate change policy, with seven key articles by leading environmental economists including Cameron Hepburn, Dieter Helm, David Pearce, Ian Parry and others. Individual papers available as .pdfs.
Managing Permit Markets to Stabilize Prices by Richard Newell, William Pizer, and Jiangfeng Zhang, published in Resources for the Future June 2003. "The political economy of environmental policy favors the use of quantity-based instruments over price-based instruments (e.g., tradable permits over green taxes), at least in the United States. With cost uncertainty, however, there are clear efficiency advantages to prices in many cases, especially for stock pollutants such as greenhouse gases. The question arises, therefore, of whether one can design flexible quantity policies that mimic the behavior of price policies, namely stable permit prices and abatement costs ... "
Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather - paper by Suzi Kerr (Motu Economic Research, Wellington, New Zealand) and Peter Crampton (Department of Economics, University of Maryland, USA) setting out the case for auctioning GHG emission rights as opposed to giving them away, and for using the "ascending clock" auction system. Published in Energy Policy 30, 333-345, 2002. "Abstract: An auction of carbon permits is the best way to achieve carbon caps set by international negotiation to limit global climate change. To minimize administrative costs, permits would be required at the level of oil refineries, natural gas pipe lines, liquid sellers, and coal processing plants. To maximize liquidity in secondary markets, permits would be fully tradable and bankable. The government would conduct quarterly auctions. A standard ascending-clock auction in which price is gradually raised until there is no excess demand would provide reliable price discovery. An auction is preferred to grandfathering (giving companies permits based on historical output or emissions), because it allows reduced tax distortions, provides more flexibility in distribution of costs, provides greater incentives for innovation, and reduces the need for politically contentious arguments over the allocation of rents." The arguments set out in this paper form a key part of the Kyoto2 proposals.
Market-Based Environmental Policies by Robert N. Stavins, Discussion Paper 98-26 of March 1998, published by Resources for the Future. A useful introduction to the use of economic, as opposed to command-and-control, policy instruments for achieving desired environmental objectives.